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I.  Introduction. 
 
Now, well after the first flushes of excitement in the immediate aftermath of 
decolonization -- when it seemed possible that movements of national liberation might 
overthrow colonial regimes along with their pervasive legacies -- it is generally accepted 
that colonialism did not die so quick a death after all.  Instead, it has become increasingly 
clear that colonialism lived (and lives) on in many forms and ways.  Most obviously, 
colonial rule had political and economic effects that have been captured, at least in part, 
by the terms “neo-colonialism” and “neo-imperialism.”  The political instability of many 
new nations was clearly the result of a multitude of infrastructural problems, ranging 
from the enormous chasms separating colonial elites from the populace to the myriad 
divisions that had often been carefully engineered by colonial regimes precisely to retard 
the political development of nationalism.  Similarly, economic underdevelopment was 
widely seen as the result of limited colonial investment and the continuation of marked 
disparities in access both to capital and markets between the formerly colonized and their 
colonizers.  But even in the most scathing of early critiques, the depth of the disparities, 
and the continued commitment of new (and old) “colonial” institutions to political and 
economic dominance on a global scale, was hardly anticipated.  And, perhaps as 
significantly, the extent to which the impact of colonialism was social and cultural as 
well as political and economic obscured both the prospective durability of colonial forms 
of dominance and the many ways in which colonialism lived on in the categories and 
procedures of knowledge itself.   
Colonial policies varied as extravagantly as colonial history itself.  To suggest 
that colonialism was (or is) a single entity is not just analytically problematic but another 
form of colonial mystification.
2  I will argue in this paper that we can learn a great deal 
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about the problems confronted by the postcolonial world when we think about colonial 
history in comparative terms and frames.  However, what makes the comparative 
enterprise most fruitful is the strange and ironic way in which colonialism is united far 
more by its legacies than by its various causes or characteristics.  When seeking to 
understand colonial history, it matters a great deal whether we examine colonial empires 
established in the eighteenth or the nineteenth centuries.  There were extraordinary 
differences between colonial policies in Asia and Africa, as well as on the part of the 
major colonial powers: England and France, but also Holland, Belgium, and Portugal.  
And in each case, the responses – both the accommodations and the resistances – to 
colonial power on the part of colonized groups shaped the nature of the colonial regime 
as well as its subsequent histories.  Nevertheless, despite these differences, colonialism 
made a mark on a huge swath of the globe that shares many features of colonial and 
postcolonial history.  Although we urgently confront the need to translate the historical 
condemnation of past imperium -- now that we are confronted with a newly shameless 
resurgence of imperial aspiration -- into more contemporary registers of critique and 
judgment, there is much to be gained by remembering the horrific consequences of 
colonialism for the ways in which the modern world has been formed.  Indeed, there are 
extraordinary similarities between empire then and now, so much so that it is difficult to 
believe the West has really learnt any of the manifold lessons that colonial history and its 
aftermath in decolonization should have taught it. 
 
II.  Colonialism: the category 
 
Colonialism is a general term signifying domination and hegemony, classically in 
the form of political rule and economic control on the part of a European state over 
territories and peoples outside Europe.  The earliest forms of colonialism in this sense 
(not all empires were colonial empires) were exhibited in the New World by Spain and 
Portugal, although classical colonialism only flowered later in conjunction with the rise 
of global capitalism, manifested in the rule by European states over various polities in 
Asia and Africa.  There were exceptions to these rules, as in the case of Japanese colonial 
domination over Manchukuo, Korea and parts of Southeast Asia in the mid-twentieth 
century, but even here European colonial power played a critical, if rather more invisible, 
role.
3  To be a powerful nation-state, in the European mold, Japan had also to be an 
empire. 
  Imperialism is sometimes seen as an interchangeable term with colonialism, even 
as it has often been used to focus on the economic, and specifically capitalist, character of 
colonial rule.  Colonialism itself has sometimes been reserved for cases of settler 
colonialism, where segments of the dominant population not only rule over but settle in 
colonial territories.  However, most scholars agree that colonialism was in fact a form of 
rule that was most often not accompanied by European settlement, and that the term 
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colonialism entails sustained control over a local population by states that were neither 
interested in settlement nor in assimilation.  As a term of comparative scholarship, 
colonialism in all cases directs attention towards the colonies themselves, whereas the 
rubric of imperialism typically directs attention to the metropole and the global system, in 
which political and economic imperatives worked to make empire a constitutive 
condition of the West’s global dominance during modern times. 
  The terminological tensions within and between terms help us identify some of 
the key conditions of colonialism.  First, to think about colonialism is to think about the 
relationship between Europe and other parts of the world.  Spanish colonialism might 
have preceded formal capitalism, and it might have been, like early Portuguese 
colonialism, conducted in the name of the church rather than the crown, the conversion of 
souls the first front for colonization.
4  However, church and crown appeared 
indistinguishable in colonial settings for the same reasons that many other metropolitan 
distinctions blurred in the blinding light of colonial power.  Europe achieved both a large 
measure of its unique, and uniform, identity and its seemingly insurmountable world 
position through its claim to mastery over subject peoples in colonial settings.  As Fanon 
once put it, “Europe is literally the creation of the third world.” 
  Already we run into conceptual as well as historical difficulties.  Many of the 
categories used by colonizers and colonized alike to understand colonialism were 
themselves produced through colonial encounters.  Although colonial conquest was 
predicated on the power of superior arms, military organization, political centralization, 
and economic wealth, it also produced the conditions for all of these to take on greater 
significance than could ever have been imagined before.  At the same time, military, 
economic, and political forms of power were inexorably based on a host of cultural 
technologies; indeed, colonialism was largely a cultural project of control.  Colonial 
knowledge both enabled colonial conquest and was produced by it.  Cultural forms in 
newly classified “traditional” societies were reconstructed and transformed by and 
through colonial interventions, creating new categories and oppositions between 
colonizers and colonized, European and other, modern and traditional, West and East, 
even male and female.  If, then, Europe is fundamental to the history of colonialism, 
Europe is also part of a larger set of opposed terms that were in turn produced by 
colonialism. 
  Colonialism is also critically linked to the idea of enlightenment, the age of 
discovery and reason.  Reason gave discovery a justification and a new meaning, but it 
also took its expanding global laboratory for granted.  Science flourished in the 
eighteenth century not merely because of the intense curiosity of individuals working in 
Europe, but because colonial expansion both necessitated and facilitated the active 
exercise of the scientific imagination.  It was through discovery – the siting, surveying, 
mapping, naming, and ultimately possessing – of new regions that science itself could 
open new territories of conquest, among them cartography, geography, botany, philology, 
and anthropology.  As the world was literally shaped for Europe through cartography – 
which, writ large, encompassed the narration of ship logs and route maps, the drawing of 
boundaries, the extermination of “natives,” the settling of peoples, the appropriation of 
property, the assessment of revenue, the raising of flags, and the writing of new histories  
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– it was also parceled into clusters of colonized territories to be controlled by increasingly 
powerful European nations, the Dutch, French, and English/British in particular.  
Marking land and marking bodies turned out to be two sides of the same coin.  
  And coin was important too.  Bullion procured from the New World made the 
purchase of Asian commodities, from spices to tea, possible.
5  Even as Asian spices made 
the European diet palatable, sugar had to be imported to make tea potable.  The exploding 
trade in these and other commodities drove the establishment of the first stock markets in 
the late seventeenth century, in Amsterdam and then London.  The most prominent stocks 
traded on Exchange Alley after the glorious revolution of 1688 were shares of East India 
Company stock.  And if empire and capitalism were born hand in hand, they grew up in 
the same neighborhoods as well.  By the middle of the eighteenth century, markets in 
interior India had been significantly penetrated by a wily alliance of trading activity and 
merchant political power; by the early nineteenth century, the China trade not only began 
to determine mercantile as well as agricultural decisions in the Indian subcontinent but to 
recalibrate trade across the entire Indian ocean.  Indeed, whereas certain key commodities 
had circulated on a global scale from the 15
th century, the late 18
th century was the time 
when certain European powers began to control markets both of raw materials and 
various manufactured products.  Colonialism and global capitalism enabled each other as 
much as they were the political and economic realizations of a new form of global power.  
In India itself, the nascent colonial state began to develop complex institutions of revenue 
administration and collection in response to the growing recognition that local states had 
always depended primarily on relations around agrarian production rather than trade.   
  Indeed, by the nineteenth century, colonialism was as much about the 
establishment of new political orders as it was about controlling global economic ones.  
Early experiments in colonial forms of government were initially dominated by the 
British in India.  The loss of the American colonies in the late eighteenth century led 
Britain to be extremely cautious about encouraging, even allowing, European settlement, 
while the growing reliance on land revenue to fund overseas political and military 
operations led to a deepening involvement in local political and agrarian affairs.  
Settlements with large landholders were initially introduced as new modes of private 
property but soon led to a variety of customized land settlements with village 
communities and cultivators.  Meanwhile, the East India Company worked inexorably to 
fold more and more territory under its direct rule, only to be stopped by the aggressive 
expansionist policies of Lord Dalhousie in 1856.  The great mutiny was put down, but the 
even greater revolt it occasioned led to significant changes in colonial policy.  
Unconquered territories were now to be ruled indirectly, and increasingly the British 
crown, which assumed rule from the East India Company in 1858, used a variety of 
barely disguised indirect means to lessen resistance and justify its own extractive and 
dominant presence.
6 
  New indirect modes of colonial rule became increasingly attractive for European 
powers as the late nineteenth century witnessed yet another world push for colonial 
domination.  The Dutch vied with the French to control both peninsular and archipelagic 
Southeast Asia.  And then came the scramble for Africa, in which the British and French 
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were the main players, joined now by the Belgians and Germans, and for that matter the 
Portuguese, who renewed their imperial interests despite their loss of gravitas in the 
European order of states.  In most of these new colonial territories, European powers 
made clear that they had “learned” from earlier colonial history, fashioning new kinds of 
indirect rule, using local institutions and personnel to ensure loyalty and at the same time 
mask the European interests and agendas that pushed for more intense global control over 
trade, production, and markets.  More than ever, traditions were produced and the idea of 
tradition promoted to justify indirect rule.  Tribes and tribal authorities were used to 
control territories and their constituent populations, even when the authorities were 
clearly colonial puppets and the tribes themselves ossified almost beyond pre-colonial 
recognition.   
  Tradition could be used to justify the most draconian forms of colonial rule on the 
grounds of the civilizing and modernizing mission, and traditions could be used to 
implement both the mirage of colonial autonomy and the rationale for colonial 
modernity.  Tradition could also be used to explain why nationalism was as foreign to 
colonial soil as self-rule would be to colonized politics.  Thus the colonial investments in 
ideas of caste, village, chief-ship, and kin based communities.  And thus the colonial 
astonishment when it turned out that all of these institutions could play a significant role 
in the growing demand for independence.  
  Colonialism often justified itself on the grounds that traditional institutions stood 
in the way of the development of ideas of nationality and the growth of national unity.  In 
fact, colonialism both introduced European notions of national self-determination and 
hastened the growth of nationalist sentiment.
7  Much of the sentiment behind colonial 
nationalism was based on a massive reaction to the indignity of European rule, and the 
growing recognition of the racial prejudice and economic interest that predicated the 
rationalizations of colonial ideology.  Decolonization was a term that disguised the extent 
to which colonial independence was usually the outcome of militant mobilization and 
sometimes violent resistance to colonial rule on the part of new nations first in Asia and 
then in Africa.  In fact, colonial nationalism was both the antithesis of colonial rule and 
the vehicle for the development of the first sustained critiques of colonial modernity, 
liberalism, and the uses of ideas of culture to disguise economic and political interests.
8  
However, the unity and commitment of nationalist movements could hardly be sustained 
with independence in the face of the myriad challenges and infrastructural weaknesses 
that remained after formal colonial rule was dismantled.  Indeed, the effects and legacies 
of colonialism were ironically obscured precisely during the moments of nationalist 
triumph and the exuberance around independence.  I will now turn to examine some of 
these challenges and weaknesses, and attempt to assess the ways in which colonial rule 
both produced them, and created institutions and epistemological assumptions that 
worked to shift responsibility away from the colonizers and onto the colonized: in short, 
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III.  Direct Rule 
 
When in the late eighteenth century the British began to establish their dominance 
over key coastal regions in the South Asian subcontinent, there was a great deal of debate 
about whether the East India Company should aspire to assume direct rule.  Despite the 
reluctance of parliament and the concerns of the Board of Directors, the Company sought 
to attain direct control over local administration, first in Bengal, then in Madras, and soon 
thereafter in Bombay.  Although there was dual sovereignty in a de jure sense until the 
Mughal emperor was formally deposed in 1858, early imperial rule in India was 
characterized by systematic efforts to centralize control over revenue collection, judicial 
administration, and political relations more generally.  Imperial centralization entailed 
efforts to systematize and codify each of these activities.  The beneficent introduction of 
new and secure property rights was heralded as the signature of a progressive colonial 
regime.  In Bengal, Lord Cornwallis established a “permanent settlement” in 1793, 
making a revenue settlement in perpetuity with large landlords, or zamindars, who were 
in effect provided with proprietary rights over their sometimes vast estates.  In Madras a 
few years later, Thomas Munro revised efforts to extend the zamindari settlement, 
devising instead a system of settlements, subject to periodic reassessment, with local 
cultivators.  Munro’s system was accepted not just because it appeared to maintain better 
financial control over agrarian production, but also because to establish direct relations 
with peasants rather than have these relations mediated by landlords who came 
increasingly to represent the elite of the old regime.  Munro represented a colonial effort 
to involve itself as closely as possible with local administration at every level, including 
revenue collection, the administration of justice, and the maintenance of local order.  
Nevertheless, in other parts of India settlements were subsequently made with different 
units, from village based clans to village communities themselves.  In each settlement, 
the British attempted to balance their need for revenue with their concern to create new 
institutional forms of control that had the sanction of some version of tradition. 
 If,  strictly  speaking,  the  period up to 1858 must be designated as a time of 
“indirect rule”-- since the Company gave lip service to the ultimate sovereign authority of 
the Mughals -- it was nevertheless a period when Company rule sought to expand its 
political as well as its bureaucratic control over a steadily expanding set of territories in 
South Asia.  Zamindars, individual cultivators, and village communities were variably 
constituted – after long debates over Indian history and colonial policy – as the authentic 
heirs of pre-colonial society and as primary agents of a new regime of colonial rule, at the 
same time as local and regional political lords – from Tipu Sultan and the Nawab of 
Arcot to the Marathas and the Nawab of Awadh – were successively reduced to become 
either pensioners or prisoners of the new colonial establishment.  Between 1757 and 1857 
the East India Company absorbed roughly two thirds of the land mass of South Asia into 
its regime of rule, in what was an extraordinary period of imperial expansion and 
consolidation.  Although the British claimed to have been taken by surprise when a 
military mutiny turned into a large scale agrarian and political rebellion in 1857, the 
revolt was at one level a last ditch effort to resist what had already become the reality of 
British imperium in South Asia.  And, instead of throwing the British out, the rebellion 
succeeded in providing an excuse for the British to throw the Mughals out instead, and 
assume direct sovereignty for their own crown at the same time.  The irony was that by   7
the time the British succeeded in establishing what in formal terms was “direct rule,” they 
began to realize the extent to which forms of indirect rule were in fact much better suited 
to the interests and capacities of colonial power.  Although India is contrasted with much 
of colonial Africa along the classificatory axis of direct versus indirect rule, the historical 
reality is in fact considerably more complex. 
  Still, during the period of early rule in India, Britain learned a good deal about the 
advantages and disadvantages of different forms of colonial governance.  On the one 
hand, the ambiguities inherent in what came to be called “dual sovereignty” grew from 
being embarrassments to major impediments of rule.  On the other hand, providing 
ultimate sovereignty could be reserved for the colonial power, and it was frequently the 
case that indirect rule was both cheaper and easier than ruling by direct means.  It was not 
only more efficient to conquer territory when rulers were allowed to maintain local 
control, it was also less likely to provoke serious resistance down the line.  And yet, in 
early years of British expansion, the siren of full and direct control was hard to resist; it 
was only after years of learning the difficulties of imperial rule that Britain began to 
devise new strategies of indirect rule.  Even in India, the assumption of direct rule in 
1858 only applied to territories that had already been conquered.  The rest of India was 
allowed to remain under the nominal control of chiefs and princes who were 
progressively folded into a ceremonial economy of honors and privileges.  Princely India 
provided both the legitimation of traditional forms of rule and the security of loyalty and 
steady, if not always hugely substantial, taxes as “tribute.”   
By the second half of the nineteenth century, the colonial state in India was in any 
case about to undergo several major transformations.  Land, and the revenue and 
authority that accrued from the relationship between it and the state, had been 
fundamental to the formation of the early colonial state, eclipsing the formation of 
Company rule in that ineluctable combination of formal and private trade that itself 
masked the formidable state-like functions of the Company.  But the fact that the 
rebellions of 1857 so quickly led to general agrarian revolt, and the steadily increasing 
economic investment in imperial power (as for example in the joint stock funding of 
railway and telegraph infrastructural expansion) made it clear that things had to change.  
Land tax was still an important source of revenue through the century, as was much of 
the trade that had been fundamental to the mercantile origins of empire.  However, the 
extractive colonial state increasingly faced other kinds of challenges requiring a new 
basis for imperium; accordingly, imperial ambition, and anxiety, moved to new levels 
and concerns.  The steady absorption of new lands through the aggressive policies of 
Lord Dalhousie, that in the taking of Awadh in 1856 had led to such trouble, were 
brought abruptly to a halt, and policies of indirect rule were mobilized to accommodate, 
and ultimately appropriate, the incomplete project of colonial conquest.  At the same 
time, the rebellion made it clear that some communities in India could be counted as 
loyal, as others became doomed to perpetual suspicion.  These latter groups were to be 
substituted by the “martial” races, as Macaulay’s hyperbolic denunciations of effeminate 
Bengalis were transmuted into state policy.  In the new rhetorical economy of colonial 
rule, political loyalty replaced landed status.  And the form of knowledge and argument 
that seemed most appropriate to assess matters of loyalty rather than revenue was of 
course knowledge of peoples and cultures.  To put the matter in bold relief, after 1857 
anthropology supplanted history as the principal colonial modality of knowledge and   8
rule.  In even bolder terms, I have called the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
colonial state in India as the ethnographic state.
9 
  After the great rebellion, the Company’s ambitions of complete conquest were not 
only halted, but colonial interest in culture, custom, and tradition escalated dramatically.  
Missionary activity was curtailed and controlled, even as missionary knowledge was used 
to generate the first gazetteers and manuals of the new British state.  These administrative 
texts began to devote whole chapters to the ethnography of caste and custom; even as 
imperial surveys were transformed into the all India census with caste made into the 
central object of investigation.  By the time of the first decennial census of 1872, caste 
had become the primary subject of imperial classification and social knowledge.  
Although the village – so important for early investigations into revenue systems and 
local control – continued to be seen as the dominant site of Indian social life, it became 
understood more as a setting for caste relations than the primary building block of Indian 
society.  By 1901, when the census commissioner H.H. Risley announced his ambition 
for an ethnographic survey of India, it was clear that caste had attained its colonial 
apotheosis.  And in this apotheosis, not only was race the basic category of caste 
difference, religion was the basic source of values that was seen to support the caste 
system.  The Census was ultimately used for a variety of purposes, from being the site 
where caste groups mobilized to assert their superior status and community strength, to 
providing data to support the use of quotas and reservations for various non Brahman, 
scheduled caste and tribe, and Muslim constituencies, both in relation to electoral 
representation and in appointments to government jobs and entry to educational 
institutions. 
Religious differences between Hindus and Muslims were seen to have importance 
of a fundamental kind from the late eighteenth century, but as in the exacerbation of 
notions of difference between caste groups, the great rebellion played a critical 
transitional role, leading as it did to the rapid escalation of colonial efforts to identify, 
classify, and enumerate different communities.  If Risley’s racial vision gave the Census 
an especially significant role in the production of modern caste identities in India, it also 
provided the ideological basis for an even more dramatic contribution to the modern rise 
of communalism.  As Home Secretary to the Indian Government, a position he assumed 
after his stint as Director of Ethnography, Risley played a key role in the 1903 proposal 
that Bengal be partitioned into two provinces, in large part because of the political 
benefits thought to attend the separation of the politically threatened Hindu minority from 
the majority Muslim population.
10  A few years later, Risley argued strongly against the 
view of John Morley, Secretary of State for India, that serious political reforms were 
necessary in the wake of the agitation over the 1905 partition, in particular the Swadeshi 
movement of 1905-07.  Risley was against territorial representation and parliamentary 
government for India, and used the demand of the newly formed Muslim League for 
separate electorates to make his case.  In the end, the award of separate electorates for 
Muslims in the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 was in large part the result of the energetic 
role played by Risley, who used his ethnological view of India to make one of the most 
                                                           
9 See my Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India. 
10 See, for example, Sumit Sarkar’s thorough discussion of this in his, The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, 
1903-1908.  New Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1973. 
   9
influential, and deadly, decisions of Britain’s colonial era.
11  It was this award of separate 
electorates in 1909 that set the stage for major political conflict between Muslims and 
Hindus, leading to the demand for Pakistan and the eventual partition of the 
subcontinent.
12  Risley’s anthropology had extraordinary repercussions across the 
subcontinent to the present day. 
 
IV.  Indirect Rule 
 
If in the British experience of colonizing India indirect rule was initially seen as a 
transitional phase of colonial duplicity, leading necessarily and inexorably to the 
establishment of direct political control, by the late nineteenth century it became clear 
that direct rule had its own problems.  Demands for political consultation and 
representation on the part of the nascent nationalist movement were enabled by the 
inauguration of direct rule, even as the ideology of direct rule was effectively continuous 
with the early nineteenth century liberal traditions of Mill and Macaulay.  Macaulay’s 
efforts to establish a single legal code, for example, came undone precisely because the 
English in India did not wish to be subjected to the possibility that they would be judged 
by Indians.  And Macaulay’s expectation that Indian subjects would be capable of self-
rule once properly civilized was the basis of an early colonial educational policy that ran 
up against the same colonial racism that rejected the civilizing mission and sought instead 
to find ways to make imperial rule permanent.  Macaulay had devised a proposal for a 
uniform civil code that in fact became enacted only thirty years later, in 1861, but it was 
short-lived.  A uniform code could not accommodate the fundamental contradictions of 
race in a colonial situation, where a large segment of the European population in India 
reacted violently to the prospect, however unlikely, of being judged by an Indian 
magistrate.  The agitation over the Ilbert Bill in 1883 made clear that even Macaulay’s 
provisional optimism was to be checked by a concerted effort to compartmentalize Indian 
society and restrict the possible growth of Indian political development.  And just as it 
happened to coincide with the emergence of a formal nationalist organization, it also 
provided an informal charter for the conviction that law in colonial situations, rather than 
being universalized, had to be constrained by racial and cultural boundaries.   
Meanwhile, indirect rule was developing as the colonial strategy of choice in 
British ruled Africa, and not coincidentally legal policy was closely tied to political 
policy.  The creation of a separate though subordinate state structure in colonial Africa 
was first developed in southern Africa, rather than West Africa as more commonly 
believed.
13  Natal had been annexed by Great Britain in 1843, and although it was soon 
announced that both political rule and legal authority had been decisively superceded by 
British power, Britain soon realized the attractiveness of devising mechanisms that would 
administer natives according to their own laws and customs.  In Natal, this early 
commitment to the development of customary law was accompanied by the desire to 
aggregate the natives as much as possible in their traditional, separate, locations.  
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Administered by the Natal Native Trust, customary law developed to the point of being 
codified, in 1891, as the Natal Code of Native Law.  As time went on, native law became 
the means by which the tribe, and the tribal chief, became inscribed as the principal 
institutional sites of mediation and control for colonial rule throughout southern Africa.  
Although indirect rule thus developed first in southern Africa, it was given its formal 
definition by Lord Lugard, in large part on the basis of his own work as a colonial 
administrator in Nigeria.  For Lugard, indirect rule required three fundamental 
institutions: a native court, a native administration, and a native treasury.  But as Lugard 
explained in one of his famous minutes, in 1919, these institutions had simultaneously to 
appear to be autonomous but in fact never be independent of British control.  As he 
noted, “The policy of the Government was that these chiefs should govern their people, 
not as independent but as dependent Rulers.  The orders of Government are not conveyed 
to the people through them, but emanate from them in accordance where necessary with 
instructions received through the Resident.”
14  The courts, in Lugard’s scheme, were to 
administer “native law” and be presided over by “native judges,” though the courts were 
never to violate the ordinances of government which were to operate everywhere.  At the 
same time, while the taxes were to be collected in the name of the native ruler and by his 
agents, they were not only to fund a fixed amount for the colonial government, but to be 
administered under the ultimate control of the British Governor.   
  Although the British presumed that a native state apparatus existed before being 
assumed by this structure of indirect rule, it was deemed possible by Lugard and others to 
build such an apparatus if it did not already exist.  In fact, it often became necessary to 
invent tribes, tribal authorities, and systems of political authority according to a 
traditional template based on the role and position of the tribal chief.  For example, John 
Iliffe has demonstrated that in Tanganyika the British Governors frequently provided 
chiefless peoples with chiefs, even as they demarcated tribal units and boundaries with 
administrative precision and efficiency.
15  Sir Donald Cameron, who was appointed as 
the governor of Tanganyika in 1925, made clear what was at stake when he wrote, “It is 
our duty to do everything in our power to develop the native on lines which will not 
Westernize him and turn him into a bad imitation of a European,” the point being rather 
to “make him a good African.”  Thus it was deemed necessary to protect native tribal 
organizations, and create them (or, as many colonial administrators increasingly believed, 
recreate them) where they didn’t (or had ceased to) exist.  Cameron was clear about the 
colonial landscape:  “If we set up merely a European form of administration, the day will 
come when the people of the Territory will demand that the British form of 
administration shall pass into their hands – we have India at our door as an object lesson.  
If we aim at indirect administration through the appropriate Native Authority—Chief or 
Council—founded on the people’s own traditions and preserving their own tribal 
organization, their own laws and customs purged of anything that is “repugnant to justice 
and morality” we shall be building an edifice with some foundation to it, capable of 
standing the shock which will inevitably come when the educated native seeks to gain the 
possession of the machinery of Government and to run it on Western lines… If we treat 
them properly, moreover, we shall have the members of the Native Administration on our 
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side.” 
16 In other words, if the natives did not live up to their anthropological reputations, 
they would be anthropologized, fashioned into the appropriate image of cultural 
otherness, in acts of extraordinary colonial hubris.  The British certainly did not wish to 
see the repetition of their experience in India, where the civilizing project of Mill and 
Macaulay had led, so they thought, to what even in 1925 was seen as an unconscionable 
transfer of political authority. 
But the invention of native Africa was more easily imagined than done, precisely 
because the pre-colonial realities were so much more complicated than colonial 
anthropological desire would have it.  The colonial politics of recognition worked 
through an elaborately constructed anthropological grid, in which colonized societies 
only appeared in the form of designated traditions, such as caste, village, ethnicity, tribe, 
and so on, and in which these traditions could only be represented by appropriate elders 
and chiefs.  In colonial situations, neither civil society nor modern political institutions 
could be granted any real condition of possibility.  Instead, caste as a single all-
encompassing structure of other-worldly social order, or tribe as an all-embracing social 
identity, were substituted for civil society, and a complex network of native political 
authorities and legal procedures – all under the benevolent protection and guidance of the 
colonial authority – was installed as the relevant intermediary colonial political structure.  
It was understood that things could not change.  That is, it became a mandate of colonial 
rule that tradition should be nurtured in the name of protection and toleration than for 
modernity and civilization to be introduced in such a way as to create the political 
conditions of a nationalist movement, as became the colonial alarm bell of twentieth 
century Indian politics. 
British colonial rule in Africa led to the exacerbation both of ethnic and religious 
identities, as can be seen clearly in the introduction of indirect rule in the Sudan in 1921 
with the creation of administrative units based on the putative existence of discrete tribes 
and ethnic groups.  Indirect rule was mapped onto the colonial constituted “Africans” of 
the South and the “Muslim-Arabs” of the North, creating two completely separate 
identities as time went on.  Indeed, the policy of separate government was aimed less at 
creating a non-Islamic southern culture than it was in stemming the tide of Islamic 
expansion.  The south was cut off from the north through such measures as the 
promulgation of the Closed District Ordinance of 1922, which led to further efforts to 
develop the south along what were seen as “indigenous and African lines.”  The 
association of slavery with Islamization also aided the elaboration of an oppositional 
southern identity.  The rise of the Mahdi after 1885 had served to link slaveholding with 
the religious transformation of slaves, and was used in the south to encourage conversion, 
and English education, as a supplementary cultural means to resist Arabism, Islam, and 
the perceived threat of slavery.  The colonial backdrop does much to explain why the 
Sudanese civil war became the longest running conflict in Africa, and why Sudan became 
one of the sites for the development of a colonially inspired anti-Islamist ideology 
throughout British Africa.  The postcolonial rule of Nimieri, who used a national program 
of Islamization to buttress his regime between 1977 and 1985, followed direct colonial 
precedent, especially when in 1983 he divided the southern region into three autonomous 
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provinces and tried to set them against each other at the same time he sought to spread 
the influence of northern elites.
17 
  The British conduct of colonial rule was immensely influential for other colonial 
powers as well.  The Belgians introduced institutions of indirect rule into the Congo in 
the 1920s.  A special legal category for natives, who were placed under customary law 
and exempted from the provisions of the Code Napoleon, was created early on, and from 
1921 Africans were required to return to the rural areas where they were deemed to be 
natives.  Between 1931 and 1933 a series of decrees mandated that natives were 
permanently to be seen as peasants, only temporarily allowed to serve as workers under 
specific, colonially sanctioned, conditions. This of course hardly meant that peasants did 
not frequently serve as colonial workers; from early colonial days it had been one of the 
principal duties of chiefs to enforce such measures as “forced labor, compulsory 
cultivation, conscription, labor recruitment and other state requirements.”
18  Well before 
Joseph Conrad brought attention to the horrors of Belgian colonialism in the Congo, 
Mark Twain had decried the, “organized system of plunder and outrage” built on the “the 
most diverse imposts in labor or in kind,” in King Leopold’s Congo.  And Belgium’s 
assumption of state control over its colonial holdings after the termination of King 
Leopold’s personal overrule only made these labor practices more systematic and 
draconian -- institutionalized in the very practice of law -- than they had been before. 
The Portuguese, who had begun their colonial adventures in earlier centuries, 
were initially committed to a policy of colonial assimilation, under the larger project of 
Christian conversion.  The profession of Christianity was seen as, “sufficient 
qualification for equal political and judicial rights.”  But when, for example, the 
Portuguese conquered the Ovimbundu kingdoms in the central highland region of Angola 
during the nineteenth century, they neglected the immense social and political changes 
that had been brought about by such events as the end of the Atlantic slave trade and 
sought to reconstitute the system of village leadership under “sekulas.”
19  Village sekulas 
were selected from among the descendents of village founders, and recruited these 
leaders to assist them in supplying manpower, collecting tax, and enforcing order.  The 
establishment of the Department of Native Affairs in 1914 was intended to extend and 
coordinate native policy, but reliance on the system of local sekulas continued, as the 
colonial government could avoid the costs of codifying and administering African law 
and employing local Portuguese civil servants.  As in other colonial contexts, the local 
population was divided between the civilized (assimilado) and non-civilized (nao-
assimilado), enabling not only a distinction between collaborators and converts on the 
one hand and a subordinate labor force on the other.  As labor became a greater concern 
of the colonial state, it was increasingly held that work, rather than simply conversion, 
could be the means of becoming civilized.  Under Salazar in 1933, a circular was sent out 
to administrators stating that if, “the black man wishes to have equal rights with the white 
man… he must work.”  Between 1950 and 1959, however, only 5,000 Africans qualified 
as assimilados.  As with all colonial promises of assimilation, efforts were made to 
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contain the possible realization of any of the cultural bribes that were used to recruit 
collaboration and labor.  In the case of Portuguese Angola, not only did colonial laws 
prevent non-assimilados from adopting Portuguese culture, the colonial state effectively 
created a system of state slavery to provide for necessary plantation labor in the coffee, 
sisal, sugar, and palm oil industries.  By the late 1950s, nearly four out of every five 
Ovimbundu males were migrant laborers, none of whom received any of the benefits 
promised by civilization.  
Similarly, in Mozambique, the institutions of the indigenato defined colonized 
peoples by common language and culture and made possible the bifurcation of the 
colonial state into civil and customary spheres of citizens and subjects, of indigena 
(native) and nao-indigena (non-native).  Bridget O’Laughlin has drawn attention to the 
way in which this classification was more a response to the labor question than to 
political issues,
20 but, as in Angola, political and economic effects went hand in hand.  
The colonial state needed to organize labor and a new regime of compulsions following 
the abolition of slavery, and the distinction between citizen and indigene was also one 
between free and forced labor.  Mediated through institutions such as the Office for 
Native Affairs and Emigration, it was intended to give the state greater control over the 
allocation of labor.  Native chiefs and sub-chiefs – the regulos and the cabos – were 
supported by the state precisely so that they would be responsible for the procurement of 
labor.  Colonial reforms during the 1960s had little effect, in part because of the extent to 
which local government had been reorganized around colonial economic needs, but also 
because colonial officials used their older lines of command to secure loyalty in the face 
of international pressure and the rise of a powerful anti-colonial movement.   
  Before considering the effects of different forms of indirect rule, however, it is 
necessary to go back to look at the origins of the colonial logic of assimilation, and to 
examine what led to the early rhetoric of colonialism as a civilizing mission.  If the 
British in twentieth century India attributed many of their political problems to the 
policies of anglicist educational and legal reformers of the early nineteenth century, it 
was certainly the case that other colonial powers also felt the need to represent their rule 
as bringing civilization to the dark continents of the globe.  And since the French claimed 
to have invented the idea of civilization itself, it stands to reason that the civilizing 
mission attained its highest expression under early French colonial rule.  
 
V.  The Civilizing Mission:  Assimilation as Colonial Strategy 
 
The unhappy fate of the short-lived Haitian revolution made clear the differences 
between metropolitan and colonial France, despite the post revolutionary rhetoric of 
equality, fraternity, and liberty.  Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt in 1799 marked the 
explicit recommencement of French imperial ambition, which had lost considerable 
momentum first because of repeated losses to the British in India in the mid eighteenth 
century and then because of the revolution itself.  But the revolution was not without any 
consequence, and might be traced as the direct cause for the birth of the ideology of the 
civilizing mission, born on the banks of the river Nile in the wake of the Napoleonic 
conquest.  Of course, Napoleon himself did not take it all that seriously, as when he 
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reintroduced slavery in Martinique and Guadalupe after recapturing the islands from the 
British in 1802.  But the belief that the French owed something to its colonized others, 
most of all the opportunity to benefit from the civilizing character of being and speaking 
French, emerged nevertheless as the signal ideology of French colonial discourse at the 
dawn of the nineteenth century itself.   
  More important than the short lived empire in Egypt for this development, 
however, was the conquest of Algeria in the 1820s, which raised challenges for the 
French that had not arisen in its relations with the outré mer islands of the Caribbean.  It 
was in Algeria in the middle decades of the nineteenth century that the French developed 
their conviction that colonial rule required the extension of civilization through the 
cultivation of education and new systems of justice, however adapted to African 
conditions.  But while some French leaders spoke of the fusion of the French and 
Algerian people, and intermarriage was on occasion encouraged in the early years of the 
colonial relationship, the limits of colonial exchange became clear very soon.  By the 
1870s intermarriage was actively discouraged, and the level of colonial distrust, 
heightened by years of significant resistance to French rule, had already begun to change 
the contours of colonial mentalite.  Indeed, the colonial conviction that the French were 
spreading civilization along with empire developed its most distinctive form in the wake 
of the long and uneven conquest of French West Africa in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, when the French finally realized that their objectives of territorial 
acquisition and economic expansion through imperial strategies required significant 
cultural consolidation, both in the colony and at home.   
   From 1895, then, French colonial officials in western Africa established 
significant initiatives in public works and public health, education and the law, all in the 
name of what was dubbed the doctrine of moral progress.  As in other colonial situations, 
public works were frequently justified by the claim that they were designed solely for the 
good of the colonized, while they were in fact built to aid in the extraction of raw 
materials, the movement of the colonial army and police, and the development of 
infrastructures that would ensure economic benefit for the imperial mother country.  At 
the same time, the French put more emphasis on establishing schools, teaching French 
culture, and designing new legal codes than other European colonial powers engaged in 
during the same decades in other parts of Africa.  There were limits, of course.  Only a 
few Africans were expected to become French citizens, and even they were imagined to 
maintain their primary commitments to Africa.  And, the French felt as duty-bound as 
other colonial powers to respect what they saw as “traditional” West African customs, as 
long as these customs did not contradict the universal moral dictates of the principles of 
civilization as defined by the Third Republic.
21  Once again, the logic of colonial rule 
required both the cultivation of tradition and the careful introduction of universal values 
with the principal aim of bettering and even perfecting the traditional – that is to say the 
colonial – order of things.  However, tradition was incompatible with assimilation, and 
assimilation itself was far more the rhetoric of colonial benevolence than it was the basis 
of actual policy. 
  World War I had important consequences for colonial policy and practice in 
Africa.  The recruitment of large numbers of African soldiers led the French to worry that 
                                                           
21 See Alice L. Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 
1895-1930.  Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997.   15
these soldiers would be among those requesting French citizenship on the basis of their 
service, an outcome that did, later, come to play an important role in revealing the 
contradictions of French rhetoric.
22  At the same time, the French developed a greater 
interest in cultivating the West African aristocracy, the usual colonial response in times 
when political loyalty and military pressure made colonial occupation appear more 
precarious.  After the war, the French also began to systematize their enforcement of 
coercive labor practices, insisting like other colonial powers on the regular, periodic, use 
of African labor for European services, as long as agricultural production was seen as 
unharmed, at the same time funneling increasing labor power into the growing plantation 
economy.  Coerced labor was justified both by the notion of mise en valeur – the 
development of the natural and human resources of West Africa – and in relation to new 
racial beliefs that gave increasing significance to the project of race regeneration.  Racism 
was often cast in the service of scientific progress, in which public hygiene was seen as 
related to the preservation of race, while it also justified a growing commitment to 
“traditional” institutions and values.  As before, the idea of the civilizing mission was 
adapted to justify newly separatist social policies and increasingly draconian labor 
practices, and the recognition of contradiction awaited the emergence of political dissent 
and resistance.  Doubtless the proximity of Portuguese and Belgian colonies sustained the 
French belief in their own superior colonial policy, but the disparities between republican 
values and actual colonial policy were vastly exacerbated by the French experience in 
West Africa in the years after the first world war. 
   In the end, French adjustments of their civilizing mission and ambitions of 
assimilation produced a mode of statecraft very similar to that implemented by the British 
in Africa, where indirect rule and the use of native authorities and customary law were 
used to deflect much of the direct force of colonial power.
23  While the British outlawed 
the use of force in every British colony in the aftermath of the WWI, they did not in fact 
prohibit force when applied by native authorities, for that would have been to interfere 
with custom.  The French followed suit after WWII, using what in fact was a parallel 
structure of native institutions and legal procedures to implement development measures 
– and now oversee earlier systems of forced labor – on reluctant peasants.  As Mahmood 
Mamdani has argued, custom was both “the name of force,” and the “halo around the 
regime of decentralized despotism.”
24  Mamdani suggests that these colonial procedures 
of indirect rule/force were as despotic as any direct rule/force could have been, but were 
“decentralized” in a range of so-called traditional institutional forms that began to take on 
a life of their own, continuing to destabilize state and society in postcolonial Africa.  
Much has been made of the weakness of the colonial state, but in the colonial situation 
weakness – and the refusal to invest significant resources despite the promises of colonial 
development – became the basis of deliberate colonial strategy.  It was not the weakness 
of the colonial state that led to uneven development and marked disparities between the 
small elite centers and the rest, but the accommodations made to allow colonialism to be 
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done on the cheap.  We will evaluate this argument in relation to other colonial legacies 
in a later section.  First, we need to look at the way in which the colonial state used 
discourses and policies of protection around threatened “minorities” to divide colonial 
societies, sustaining both their rule, and its destabilizing effects for postcolonial polities 
as well. 
 
VI.  Minority Rights and the Colonial Logic of Protection 
 
         The propensity of colonial states to rule through strategies of division is well 
known, though scholars are steadily demonstrating the extraordinary extent to which the 
very communities or entities that were set against each other for colonial purposes were 
themselves products of colonial rule.  This is not to credit Europe, already seen as the 
sole author of enlightenment values and modern institutions even by the most critical 
voices, with yet more global authorship, even of genuinely distinct values and institutions 
of importance to the non-European world.  For one thing, the imperial encounter played a 
constitutive role in the birth of European nationalism, capitalist development,  and the 
attainment of many of the core components of modernity.
25  For another, colonial rule has 
served to disguise if not erase the histories of pre-colonial states and societies, 
exchanging these histories for colonial anthropological accounts of places that were 
viewed as outside of history until colonial rulers came to rescue them from historical 
oblivion.  It is only in this context that it is meaningful to assert that Europe served to 
reconfigure, and on occasions manufacture outright, many of the examples of tradition 
that are routinely used to explain the underdevelopment of the so-called third world.   
We have already noted examples when European rulers, failing to find tribes or 
traditional tribal chiefs in African colonies, set about the produce them, justifying their 
interventions on the grounds that they were preserving rather than destroying the 
traditional fabric of the societies they were colonizing and exploiting.  That being said, 
the concept of the invention of tradition requires considerable rethinking. As Mamdani 
has asserted in his own argument about the colonial constitution of tribes, ethnicities, and 
customs, tribalism was in some ways less an effect of colonialism than it was the very 
form of colonial rule.  Mamdani speaks instead of the “making” of ethnicities, tribes, 
customs, and so on.
26  In South Asia, the British were no less draconian in their social 
interventions and cultural justifications, but the process of colonial invention was in some 
ways even more complex – and less visible – than in other colonial domains.  When 
devising systems of property and revenue collection, the colonial state worked to “fix” 
and “secure” a variety of notional identities, creating newly reified groups of proprietary 
landlords, landed peasants, landless laborers, all of them newly linked by titles and 
revenue obligations rather than multiple social and political relations to a fundamentally 
different kind of state structure.  Since no colonial system worked perfectly to secure 
both a regular revenue payment and sustained political loyalty, the state often found itself 
seeking to undo what it had just done, but even here, the logic of constructing a new kind 
of social system, with single and unitary identities and functions, had a kind of colonial 
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brutality that was unrecognized through the fog of British assertion that the new state was 
simply ordering and organizing what had pre-existed it, with a few new improvements 
such as the security of property and the sentiments of managerial propriety.  And, as the 
state was transformed from a revenue state into an ethnographic state, the emergent social 
and cultural landscape of the subcontinent – understood increasingly, as the nineteenth 
century wore on, through anthropological understandings of religion, caste, and region – 
was irrevocably changed.  Ironically, the most significant moments of transformation 
were shaped by efforts to resist colonial rule, whether in the great rebellion, the social 
reform movements and early nationalism, as well as the efforts on the part of newly 
constituted caste groups to seek different forms of recognition in the census.  
  In this complex stew of colonial constitutions in India, two developments came to 
have more importance than all the others.  The first was the constitution of religious 
communities as bounded, unitary, confessional, distinct, and fundamentally opposed 
groups sanctioned by inclusion in the small group, however hierarchically conceived, of 
major world religions.  In particular, it is widely accepted among scholars that Hinduism 
as a single faith, linking all castes, classes, regions (and formerly caste-less groups such 
as Dalits, or scheduled castes and tribes) was the gradual product of colonial forms of 
knowledge and rule
27.  It is not that Hinduism as a generic descriptive term was 
altogether new, but rather that Hinduism as a single identity only developed as a potent 
force under the conditions of colonial modernity.  By colonial modernity, we refer 
generally to the specific conditions under which modernity was introduced in colonial 
situations, where the modern was used to justify colonial rule, both to signify colonizer 
superiority and colonized lack.  Inasmuch as various aspects of “modernity” were heartily 
embraced by early colonial elites, as in the extraordinary efflorescence of social reform 
movements in nineteenth century India, the various humiliations of modernity’s uses for 
colonial purposes could never move far from the surface, eliciting contradictory 
responses at best, and outright hostility at worst. Thus not only did social reform 
movements engender neo-traditionalist responses from an early stage, they also led to an 
inevitable clash between those who gave priority to political nationalism and those who 
felt that social and political reform could not be separated.   
  If Hinduism emerged as an identitarian community under conditions of colonial 
modernity, it not only used Christian models – as in for example the privileging of certain 
specific texts as scriptural authorities, the increasing emphasis on belief over practice,  
the association of communitarian movements with institutions such as temples and 
monasteries, and the erosion of internal differences and boundaries in the face of putative 
outside threats – to establish its new identity, it also used modern technologies of 
mobilization and community formation.
28  It also emerged in relation to Islam, but again 
under specifically colonial conditions.  After the great rebellion of 1857, Muslims in 
India felt on the defensive with the British, having been cast in the position where their 
fundamental loyalty to the colonial rulers had been rendered suspect by the call to restore 
the political centrality of the Mughal emperor in Delhi.  This exceptionalist burden only 
intensified under the conditions of emergent nationalism and various colonial 
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responses.
29  Ironically, this same stigma has continued through postcolonial times, as 
Muslims in India, now more than ever, are suspected of disloyalty to the Indian state 
solely because of their religious identity.  Less well recognized, however, is the extent to 
which the Hindu claim to loyalty after the rebellion, and then to recognition as the 
dominant social and cultural identity across the subcontinent in late colonial times, was 
itself part of the contradictory logic of colonial rule.   Hinduism was transformed into the 
language of tradition – a source simultaneously of civilizational embarrassment, cultural 
pride and political assertion – that during the early twentieth century became increasingly 
the primary cultural referent of nationalist mobilization.   
  The political background to the partition of India and Pakistan is far too  
complicated to rehearse in any detail here.  Suffice it to note that British policies of 
divide and rule were nowhere more carefully enacted than in the Indian subcontinent in 
reaction to the emergence of nationalist opposition to colonial rule.
30  Despite the concern 
that Muslims might be inherently disloyal in the aftermath of the great rebellion, the 
British quickly learned that Muslims in India could be cultivated as a minority group that 
would come to see itself as in need of protection by the colonial power.  The fact that 
elite Hindus were at the forefront of early nationalist activity during the late nineteenth 
century only hastened British resolve to take on the mandate of protectionism, and the 
decision to partition Bengal in 1905 was a clear indication of an effort to provide the 
grounds for greater Muslim political power, and colonial collaboration.  The communal 
award of 1909 became in some ways the pretext for partition, in clearly conveying the 
political benefits that were to be accorded Muslim groups if they acted the part of a loyal 
minority.  Britain’s slow and reluctant response to growing nationalist pressure – a 
response that only led to decolonization because of the crises produced by the second 
world war -- ultimately made possible what was hardly thinkable before 1940, namely the 
efflorescence of the political and cultural separatism that set the stage for the creation of 
Pakistan at the moment of India’s independence.  Jinnah’s political bargaining worked in 
the end to betray his own strategic and secular politics, and while Pakistan’s early history 
has demonstrated in ample proportion the continuing contradictions of minoritarian status 
in the subcontinent, India’s Nehruvian commitment to pluralism and secularism has been 
eroded by the steady acceleration of communal forces that have used both Muslims at 
home and in Pakistan to predicate cultural mobilization of an increasingly dangerous and 
hostile nature. 
If one of the most dramatic effects of colonial history in India has been the 
denomination of Hindus as a majority community made up of the adherents of a uniform 
religious system, this history has been neither straightforward nor uncontested.  Even as 
upper-caste Hindus only came to relax the exclusionary concerns of ritual propriety in the 
face of demographic pressures and the onset of democratic institutions, the troubling 
character of the homogeneous monolith was apparent both for designated “minorities” 
and for a host of other groups.  The phantasmatic nature of the Hindu whole worked 
ironically to constitute its reality even as it made contestation and critique more urgent 
than ever.  New voices emerged as representatives of sociopolitical constituencies that 
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saw the Hindu whole as hierarchical, oppressive, and graded, the precipitate of a politics 
of exclusion that endangered groups “within” as much as outside.  And in this respect, the 
majority was an effect of the idea of the minority, even as the exemplary minority of 
Muslims created the terms of and models for other minority groups.  Minority languages 
of dissent emerged as a consequence of the general discourse of the minority, even as 
they were necessarily tied to and dependent on the majority languages of national, 
religious, regional, and ethnic unity.  In short, the constitution of minorities in colonial 
India served both to justify the colonial state, which legitimated itself in part through its 
claim to offer protection to minority groups that were seen as endangered, and to fashion 
the majority as a homogeneous group.   
With the emergence under British colonial rule of the modern caste system, the 
idea of minority was configured in similar terms, even if the minority was often in fact 
the majority group.  In western and southern India in particular, the early twentieth 
century saw a number of caste movements that sought not just recognition, but also 
representation, in areas ranging from jobs to university admissions and political inclusion 
in local and municipal elections.  These caste movements were mobilized around 
categories of “non-Brahmans” who complained about the disproportionate power and 
educational position of the small caste elite who had secured as much secular privilege as 
they had long enjoyed sacred prestige.  The non-Brahman movement was based in part 
on the claim for proportional representation and in part on anti-Brahman sentiment.  
Although these two trajectories were synergistic in early years, they soon began to 
diverge, creating the background on which leaders such as B.R. Ambedkar in western 
India and E.V. Ramaswamy Naicker in southern India came to be seen as inherently anti-
nationalist, especially as non-Brahmans began to play an increasingly important role in 
the Congress and the nationalist movement more generally.  The depressed classes were a 
more classic example of the minority, dominated by the upper castes (including non-
Brahmans) in every sense, even as they were always doomed to numerical minority with 
no natural social or political allies.  Even the depressed classes, however, were not a 
minority in the same sense as Muslims were, despite the efforts of B.R. Ambedkar, for 
example, to model untouchable politics on the strategies of the Muslim League. In the 
initial stages of political mobilization, the depressed classes sought both protection and 
inclusion, the latter through the extension of rights to political representation, economic 
benefits, and religious participation.  However, protection and inclusion turned out to be 
contradictory aims, since the development of minoritarian politics in India around the 
Muslim question led to the expectation that protection was necessary only when 
communities were committed to the maintenance of difference and separation.   
Gandhi’s desire to protect untouchables was predicated on his own commitment 
to incorporate them into the Hindu fold.  Whatever Gandhi’s own political motives, his 
social reform program was acceptable to some in the nationalist movement because it 
provided the social means to create an expanded Hindu political base that would prevail 
in any electoral form of politics, a concern that only intensified with the growing success 
of the Muslim League.  For Gandhi and most nationalists, untouchables and Muslims 
were thus fundamentally different; on the one hand, the possible conversion of 
untouchables into Muslims was to be protected against at all costs, and on the other 
Muslims were never offered the option of conversion.  Ambedkar, however, opted for 
difference, never trusting the benevolent offers of protection from the majority.  Indeed,   20
Ambedkar’s ultimate conviction that he needed to convert to another religion was a tacit 
acceptance of the minority model of the Muslim, a tragic sign of the limited conditions 
for recognition in a nation that had been constituted around a peculiar form of secular 
majoritarianism.  Under colonial conditions, protection was either the ideology that 
accompanied paternalist claims to informal modes of social welfare and political 
incorporation, or the sign of the ineradicable nature of religious difference.  Minorities 
could only claim recognition if they were ready to accept the unchanging character of 
their difference, and they could only negotiate the meaning of protectionism if they were 
ready not just to congeal forms of difference but use difference to threaten the political 
survival of the majority.  In either case, the minority was both an effect of the majority 
and the means for its consolidation as a majority.  And in either case, endangered 
communities had to face impossible choices for survival, either “converting” to 
majoritarianism as a new kind of sacred faith or asserting recognizeable forms of 
difference with enough political force to sustain some semblance of bargaining power at 
the negotiating table.   
For South Asia, the postcolonial legacies of all this were at some level clear from 
the start.  The partition of India and Pakistan left the majority and the minority 
communities with nations of their own, equal in their possible representation in the 
United Nations but decidedly unequal in terms of the geo-politics of the subcontinent.  
And the inequalities between India and Pakistan were not just the obvious ones of size, 
population, scale, non-contiguous borders, and so on, but also the way in which the 
minority nation could increasingly not contain the minority, whereas the majority nation 
could continue to house, and protect, its various minorities.  Pakistan became especially 
useful as the potential safety valve for Muslims whose commitment to minority status 
was often seen by the Indian state to exceed a commitment to new claims made on 
citizens.  Within India, the new state not only derived considerable authority from its 
maintenance of religious pluralism, it could also point with pride to its progressive 
position on questions concerning other minorities.  The constitution of India, drafted in 
large part by none other than B.R. Ambedkar, simultaneously abolished untouchability 
and provided for reservations to protect untouchables from their history of oppression and 
exclusion.  Nevertheless, the contradictions in both cases became increasingly difficult to 
contain as the political consensus inherited by Nehru from his leadership in the anti-
colonial nationalist struggle began to come up against the many other – social, economic, 
political – legacies of British colonial rule.   
 
VII.     Postcolonial Legacies:  religious, ethnic, and communal politics in postcolonial 
nations. 
 
It was no accident that despite the pervasive concerns of poverty and 
underdevelopment, the major political challenges of the first half century of postcolonial 
politics in South Asia concerned festering communal tensions between Hindus and 
Muslims, the growing significance of caste for political mobilization and claims for 
recognition and inclusion, and, of course, the escalating tensions between the two 
dominant nation-states of the subcontinent.  The pervasive tensions between India and 
Pakistan, erupting in periodic warfare and regularly demanding extraordinary investment 
in military preparedness and weaponry, have provided a grim reminder that the hastily   21
conceived and even more hastily drawn plan to partition the subcontinent left colonial 
legacies of major consequence for postcolonial society and governance.  Less obvious 
has been the way communal tensions have been inflected by partition as well.  Muslims 
were granted Indian citizenship, but not only was the original idea of an open border 
closed down so quickly that choices about citizenship were in fact artifacts of momentary 
conditions rather than openly considered deliberations about affiliation and settlement, 
Hindus were often forced to leave cities such as Karachi to provide housing and jobs for 
migrants fleeing temporary chaos in Indian homes they never imagined they were leaving 
behind forever.  The logic of the nation-state quickly overtook the multiple connections 
of families and locales and the patchwork settlement of communities across the Indian 
subcontinent over the centuries preceding 1947.  By the mid 1950s the borders between 
India and Pakistan were as heavily policed as any, and movement across them became 
increasingly difficult, even as the multiple identities that were part of lived reality crashed 
up against the reality of a permanent and total partition.
31    
In this larger context of nations and states, Hindus in Pakistan seemed an 
increasingly impossible idea, and Muslims in India became signs of India’s commitment 
to secularism and pluralism, even while Muslims were made to feel grateful to occupy 
the position of the postcolonial minority under the protectionist regime of the new 
independent state.  Hindu nationalism has used various tactics over the years to put 
pressure on Muslims to acquiesce to the sentiment that India is to Hinduism as Pakistan is 
to Islam, but the tactics have always sought to use the relative openness of India to render 
it in fact the mirror image of Pakistan.  The historical character of Muslims as “foreign 
conquerors” or “settlers” rather than “natives” has been proclaimed in many different 
contexts, most dramatically of course in the destruction of Babur’s mosque in Ayodhya.  
The recent pograms in Gujarat, using as justification the burning of the train in Godra in 
what quickly became a concerted state led effort to punish Muslims across the board, 
were motivated in part by the xenophobic and fascist sentiment that Muslims were in 
India only on sufferance, that if they caused any disruption or disturbance deserved either 
deportation or death.  Even as Muslims continue to occupy the position of minority, the 
attribution of a single identity (political as well as cultural) to all Muslims (throughout 
South Asia, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia too) has worked to reverse the image, 
making Hindus, and India, the real minority in need of protection (and, in this example, 
violent self-defense).  At the same time, any apparent interest on the part of Dalit groups 
to convert to Islam is seen as a Muslim conspiracy to diminish the numerical position of 
Hindus in India, and recent efforts on the part of Hindu nationalist groups to recruit 
scheduled castes and tribes to Hinduism has been part of this terrifying binary logic of 
fundamentalist ideology. 
Fortunately, the rising significance of “caste politics,” by which I refer in 
particular to the mobilization of lower caste groups to form political parties and 
movements to press for fundamental shifts in the nature and distribution of political 
position and resources, has worked against the rising tide of communalism at least in 
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some areas and in some respects.
32  Some of these movements emerged out of the Mandal 
agitation, in which the 1990 decision to implement reservation policies for “backward 
castes” engendered extraordinary paranoia and resistance on the part of upper caste elites.  
Nevertheless, there has been concern raised both in the aftermath of Mandal and in 
relation to caste based politics that caste is being consolidated and strengthened in these 
new movements, working against the formation of broad cross-cutting political alliances 
that could lead to coalitions that might actually be able to threaten the all India hold of 
the BJP and its constituent fundamentalist support.  At the same time, lower or backward 
caste movements have rarely been able to develop lasting alliances with emergent Dalit 
political movements, which have all too frequently found themselves oppressed even 
more violently and virulently by middle level social groups than was the situation under 
the upper caste dominated Congress party in earlier years.  That caste groups have 
become important vehicles for democratic claims for recognition and representation is 
hardly new or surprising, but the extent to which caste mobilization has worked against 
the fundamentalist cause of uniting Hindus against the presumed outside threat of 
Muslims was largely unanticipated, for the cultural call to Hindu unity was often directly 
in the service of underplaying caste and class inequality and oppression within the so-
called majority community.  Herein lies a major difference between colonial and 
postcolonial times.  Although non-Brahman movements were often branded as anti-
nationalist during colonial times, it was initially far more difficult to make this claim in 
independent India.  It is here, of course, that Hindu nationalism has sought to conjure 
Pakistan – and the Islamic world more generally – as the structural equivalent of British 
colonial rule, the ground for suppressing postcolonial movements on the part of lower 
caste or class groups. 
If India’s postcolonial present has multiple genealogical links to a colonial past 
characterized by a unique combination of direct and indirect rule, one issue raises 
especially interesting comparative issues.  For some years, Hindu nationalists have 
complained about the fact that Muslims had their own personal law, inherited directly 
from colonial rule.  As a result, there have been many advocates for a uniform civil code, 
ironically linking concerns of some secular feminist groups with polemical calls from 
Hindu nationalist groups about the continued use of “customary law” for the minority 
rather than the majority community.  In Africa, as we discussed earlier, one of the major 
differences between direct and indirect rule emerged in relation to the relative 
significance of customary law, which was used to govern tribes and ethnic groups under 
the banner of tradition, save only for the ultimate protection of universal (colonial) 
values.  Civil law was reserved for colonial elites and those “settler” groups who often 
served as the collaborators for colonial rule, making customary law a form of control 
over majorities.  Whereas the equivalent of customary law in the Indian context was used 
as a way to secure traditional valorization for colonial protectionism vis a vis a minority 
group, customary law in Africa was used to partition majority groups securely away from 
the perquisites of civil society and order. 
In the African case, customary law was associated in particular with the 
fragmentation of “native” communities into ethnicized groups that were each governed 
by their own distinct authorities and institutions.  While the pitting of “natives” and. 
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“settlers” against each other took place with unsettling effects both in South Asia and in 
Africa, this polarization was exacerbated by the weakness of civil spheres in Africa and 
the extent to which particular ethnic groups could claim new states as their exclusive 
properties, depending on which particular faction could maintain power over the state 
apparatus.  In colonial India, Muslims – hardly an elite group under colonial rule -- were 
the settlers and Hindus the natives, whereas, say, in a country such as Rwanda, the Tutsi 
– who were the elite under colonial rule – were settlers and the Hutu natives.  Under most 
colonial conditions in Africa, the categories of “native” and “settler” came to be 
rearticulated especially explosively, the most tragic case of all coming to crisis in 
Rwanda in 1994.  Under Belgian colonial rule, the Hutu had been seen as indigenous 
Bantu and the Tutsi as alien but civilizationally (and racially) superior.  In this regime, 
the Hutu were ethnicized and the Tutsi racialized, the first relegated to the rural 
hinterland outside the fragile but despotic centers of postcolonial power, the second 
recruited to the colonial and then the postcolonial civil and governmental service.  In the 
post-independent period, growing Hutu fear of Tutsi domination led to the recycling of 
the colonial language of indigeneity, with the Tutsi marked as foreigners, and Hutu 
power equated with the originary right of the native who had been oppressed by outsiders 
for centuries.   
The genocide itself has to be historicized to be properly understood, and there 
were many events from 1959 that provided the background of the crisis, many of them 
related to other crises in Uganda on the one side and the Congo on the other.  However, 
the categories that turned so deadly were decidedly exacerbated by colonial rule, which in 
the African case had put such major emphasis on categories of the indigenous and the 
non-indigenous, disfranchising the indigenous “ethnic” groups as “natives” who were to 
be ruled by their own laws and institutions as carefully constructed by colonial power.  
While not dissimilar from other colonial classificatory rubrics in South Asia, where 
religion, ethnicity, language, and indigeneity were used to divide and rule local 
populations and establish relations with compradore elites, the weakness of state and civil 
institutions in African conditions – with Belgian colonies in the worst shape – made 
matters worse.  In Rwanda, the incapacity of state and civil society to insulate itself at all 
from the hostile takeover of Hutu power in its worst possible manifestation made the 
genocide possible.   
Resentment of the Tutsis on the part of Hutus was not dissimilar from the 
resentment of Tamils in post-colonial Sri Lanka by the Sinhalese, where Tamils were 
seen as essentially foreign, the beneficiaries of colonial collaboration with the British.  In 
the Sri Lankan case, the Tamils were resented for their position in the civil service as 
well as in the domestic economy, language issues became divisive and religious 
differences between Buddhists and Hindus became further grounds of disputation in the 
years leading up to the deadly Colombo riots of 1983.  Here too, the colonial background 
was critical.  In the late 1920s, the British colonial government appointed the 
Donoughmore Commission to report on the working and difficulties of the existing 1923-
4 Constitution in Ceylon and consider proposals for its revision.  The earlier constitution 
had instituted a form of representative government with a Legislative Council consisting 
of a number of officially appointed members along with a few others elected by a 
combination of territorial constituencies and communal electorates, all elaborately 
fashioned to provide a measure of representation at the same time deterring unified   24
nationalist resistance to the colonial government.  The Commission was seen as 
important moment in the devolution of colonial power, though it was nominally 
convened as a gesture to the Ceylonese in the absence of the grant of dominion status or 
responsible government, in part in response to escalating nationalist demands in India, 
and in part because of worries surrounding the upsurge of labor and trade union activities 
in Ceylon.  The Commission concluded that the current Constitution had proved to be an 
unqualified failure and that radical changes were required, recommending a form of 
semi-responsible government in combination with a franchise similar to that of Great 
Britain.  However, full responsible government was denied on the grounds that the 
external presence of a British administration was still necessary to protect minorities in 
absence of a British-type party system, further creating the impression that Tamils were 
the favored group of colonial rule.  The creation of a largely universal franchise was 
announced as the beginning of a new democratic era, but initially it was justified within 
the colonial administration by the fact that it gave larger minority groups enough power 
to counteract the Sinhalese majority.    
  The recommendations had the immediate effect of correlating numerical strength 
with political influence, but in its rapid introduction, and in its explicit concern for 
communal and territorial representation, it encouraged the identification and mobilization 
of a majority community united by the three basic features: Sinhala language, Buddhist 
religion, and Sinhalese race.  The emergence of these elements as the ground both of 
electoral politics and civilizational rhetoric built on the colonially driven Buddhist revival 
of the nineteenth century and meant that the lasting legacy of the Donoughmore 
Constitutions’s initiation of democracy was the political calculus of electoral majorities 
and minorities.  The Tamil minority felt itself confined to the representation of grievances 
and the call for protection, first from the colonial administration and afterwards the 
independent government, at the same time the majority reacted to populist possibilities by 
becoming increasingly chauvinistic.  The political result was that neither of the majority 
parties that emerged after 1956 felt inclined to include or attend to the concerns of the 
substantial Tamil minority.  Despite the fact that civil institutions were far better 
developed than in Rwanda, Sri Lanka has witnessed a similar cycle of resentment, 
discrimination, fear, and repression, ending with an unprecedented upsurge of ethnic 
hatred and violence.  In Sri Lanka, the very civil institutions that were held up by the 
British as their gift to the colonized  became sources of growing grievance and now have 
been eroded in fundamental respects by a history of twenty years of “civil war,” in a 
context where suicide bombing was developed for the first time as a concerted political 
strategy of terror.  On occasion, the state was threatened from a fundamentalist ethno-
national movement from militant Sinhalese on the one side and multiple Tamil separatist 
groups on the other.  The JVP uprising was successfully managed, if with much 
oppression and bloodshed, though the Tamil issue has proved virtually intractable.  The 
Tamil LTTE, under the neo-fascist leadership of Prabhakaran, managed to make itself the 
only significant movement representing Tamils by violent though largely successful 
methods.  The Sri Lankan state – itself a party in the escalation of pressure on and 
violence against Tamils in the late seventies and early eighties – has consistently resisted 
the separatist claims of the Tamils, risking mutiny in its military forces and failure in its 
social and economic policies time after time.  However, even when “moderate” voices 
proposed various schemes for devolution that held some promise of genuinely addressing   25
the Tamil issue, Prabhakaran has been reluctant to entertain possible settlements that 
would in any way diminish his local position and power base. The current cease fire has 
given hope that the last twenty years of horrendous violence and stalemate might finally 
permit the formulation of a lasting political solution, but even temporary 
accommodations are welcome under the circumstances. 
 
 
VIII.  Empire after decolonization. 
 
As Hannah Arendt has noted, “it is characteristic of imperialism that national 
institutions remain separate from the colonial administration although they are allowed to 
exercise control.  The actual motivation for this separation was a curious mixture of 
arrogance and respect: the new arrogance of the administrators abroad who faced 
“backward populations” or “lower breeds” found its correlative in the respect of old 
fashioned statesmen at home who felt that no nation had the right to impose its law upon 
a foreign people.  It was in the very nature of things that the arrogance turned out to be a 
device for rule, while the respect, which remained entirely negative, did not produce a 
new way for peoples to live together, but managed only to keep the ruthless imperialist 
rule by decree within bounds.”
33  But even Arendt did not understand the extent to which 
these bounds only worked to serve imperial power, substituting culture for civil society, 
tradition for politics, and total domination for any expectation of a democratic 
relationship to the exercise of power.  This symbiosis was expressed in the development 
of ethnographic states across the colonial world, in which colonial ethnography became 
both the history of the colonized and the basis for policies of colonial rule.  Knowledge 
about colonial societies was largely produced by or in terms of the logic of colonial rule, 
the imperatives and institutions of the colonial state.  And, tragically, these imperatives 
and institutions have been inherited by postcolonial states, in a larger context in which 
the failures of these states have either been blamed directly on them or their  societies, or 
seen as the result of the failure of colonial regimes to complete the transformations and 
reforms they set in motion.  At a time when empire has come back into fashion, it is 
especially imperative to demonstrate the falsehoods in these propositions. 
  My review of different colonial cultural policies and modalities of rule suggests 
the broad similarities of colonial situations across Asia and Africa.  In thinking through 
the ways ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic, tribal, and caste divisions were systematically 
exacerbated by colonial rule, it seems increasingly beside the point to suggest that some 
colonial powers ruled better than others.  It also seems rather pointless to call for a clear 
assessment of what is genuinely traditional, and what might be seen as the hybrid by-
product of colonial manipulation and control.  Even as the consequences of colonial rule 
have been rooted in and shaped by historical events and processes, the effects of this rule, 
and the fact that colonial rule was the context in which so-called modern values, beliefs, 
and institutions were “introduced” to the colonial world, have a reality that can hardly be 
disavowed.  On the one hand, culture and tradition frequently became the means by 
which anti-colonial struggles were mobilized and fought, and many hybrid forms in the 
postcolonial world are in fact testaments to the extraordinary creativity and 
resourcefulness of colonized peoples rather than mere artifacts of the structures of 
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colonial power.
34  But even when new configurations of culture and tradition appear less 
progressive, or begin to turn from their relationship to anti-colonial struggles into the 
basis for what commentators such as Samuel Huntington have labeled a clash of 
civilization, it is necessary to remember the historical conditions that have given rise to 
current appropriations.  Indeed, the history told here reminds us all of the extent to which  
“Europe” needs to learn better how to understand and accept the extent of its implication 
in the production of the current predicaments confronted by the postcolonial world – even 
in the cultural and social domains that have so often been used to shift the responsibility 
for disparities in access to global resources, proclivities for catastrophic violence and 
political instability, and even resort to political methods branded as terrorism.  At the 
same time, “Europe” must take this responsibility in registers that also recognize the 
political and cultural consequences of its continuing imperial role and aspiration, whether 
“empire” has achieved the post-national articulations of the global argued by Hardt and 
Negri
35 or has merely resurfaced in a vaguely disguised form under the global 
stewardship of American power, in particular after 9/11.   
  It is especially alarming that the civilizational diatribes of writers such as Samuel 
Huntington and Bernard Lewis are now being used, by other writers as various as 
Michael Ignatieff, Dinesh DeSouza, and Christopher Hitchens to justify the global 
strategic and economic ambitions of the United States to the point that empire has been 
recuperated as a legitimate political form.  Michael Ignatieff has written that America 
must depart from the models of previous imperial regimes by taking the civilizing 
mission more seriously: “The old European imperialism justified itself as a mission to 
civilize, to prepare tribes and so-called lesser breeds in the habits of self-discipline 
necessary for the exercise of self-rule.  Self-rule did not have to happen soon – the 
imperial administrators hoped to enjoy the sunset as long as possible – but it was still 
held out as a distant incentive… In the new imperialism, this promise of self-rule cannot 
be kept so distant…  This is imperialism in a hurry: to spend money, to get results, to turn 
the place back to the locals and get out.  But it is similar to the old imperialism in the 
sense that real power in these zones – Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and soon, perhaps, 
Iraq – will remain in Washington.”
36  Ignatieff – like many in the corridors of power in 
contemporary Washington – is pragmatically skeptical about what is widely held as the 
core belief of our time, that national sovereignty is an ultimate value.  And the reason he 
gives is that, “however right these principles may be, the political form in which they are 
realized – the nationalist nation-building project – so often delivers liberated colonies 
straight to tyranny, as in the case of Baath Party rule in Iraq, or straight to chaos, as in 
Bosnia or Afghanistan.  For every nationalist struggle that succeeds in giving its people 
self-determination and dignity, there are more that deliver their people only to slaughter 
or terror or both.”  While he concedes that Vietnamese nationalism was a good example 
of self-determination and dignity, he argues that the Palestinian struggle is “trapped in a 
downward spiral of terror and military oppression.”  His concerns go well beyond the 
need to find reasons for multilateral intervention in situations of genocide or other forms 
of horror, for his formulation makes third world nationalism itself the problem, and 
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American empire the answer.  This has long been the view of conservative policy makers 
and academics in the United States; that members of the old left – veterans of the era in 
which the war in Vietnam sensitized an entire generation to the political integrity, and 
fundamental autonomy, of anti and post-colonial nationalist movements – signals the 
extent to which empire has returned to occupy a new kind of legitimacy in the opening 
years of the new century. 
  The current invocation of imperial pasts as something potentially different from, 
say, cognate histories of European fascism – that is as examples of historical excess best 
remembered only to keep them from repeating themselves in the present or future – make 
the kind of historical exercise constituted by this paper appear additionally relevant for us 
today.  Accounts of the problems of third world states (which are in effect the reasons 
America should shoulder not only general post-imperial burdens but engage in pre-
emptive war and military occupation) that ignore the role of the imperial past clearly 
serve to justify the imperial present, even when the point is not made explicit.  The 
resurgence of interest in imperial history has been accompanied by a kinder and gentler 
view of the European role in empire, on occasion scripted with specific lessons for the 
present that emphasize the lessons of empires past for empires present and future.  
Nevertheless, even the most uncritical imperial histories hardly prepare us for the recent 
publication by Oxford/Harvard historian Niall Ferguson,
37 a coffee table book that has 
received considerable attention and alarming acclaim.  For Ferguson, who takes great 
pains to mention a few of the most foul examples of imperial atrocity to alert his reader to 
the objectivity of his account, British empire provided the only available means for the 
modernization of the world, both in political terms – especially in the extension of the 
rule of law and the belief in the primacy of democratic political systems – and in cultural 
terms – the Anglicization of the world having been a most excellent thing, though, as he 
suggests without the whiff of an opposing view, it was this forced induction of traditional 
peoples to cultural modernity a la Anglaise that “provoked the most violent nineteenth-
century revolt against imperial rule.”
38 Imperial rule not only meant good rule (even as 
Ferguson never thinks to doubt imperial accounts of regimes it conquered or overthrew as 
examples of bad rule) but also ushered in an era of economic progress.  As he writes, 
“Without the spread of British rule around the world, it is hard to believe that the 
structures of liberal capitalism would have been so successfully established in so many 
different economies around the world…  the nineteenth century Empire undeniably 
pioneered free trade, free capital movements, and, with the abolition of slavery, free 
labour.”
39  He defends indentured labor, despite the great hardships suffered by laborers, 
on the grounds that the “mobilization of cheap and probably underemployed Asian labor” 
had significant “economic value.”
40  In short, imperialism inaugurated global capitalism, 
something far better than its alternatives.  The burden the U.S. has inherited from the 
U.K. is to continue to spread the benefits of capitalism and democracy “overseas.”  And, 
happily, “just like the British Empire before it, the American Empire unfailingly acts in 
the name of liberty, even when its own self-interest is manifestly uppermost.”
41 
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  Leaving aside the bad history purveyed by Ferguson, what seems most 
extraordinary is the extent to which the imperial view of the world has been dressed up 
and resuscitated.  Lands and peoples that had been conquered and absorbed into imperial 
regimes are likened unproblematically to rogue states and terrorist groups.  The political 
and economic difficulties of nations as various as Bangladesh and Pakistan or Rwanda 
and Congo are blamed solely on a pre-colonial past, the only problem with colonial rule 
having been its failure to complete its civilizing mission.  Despite the crudeness of the 
account, it taps into a contemporary malaise with the critique both of the West in general 
and of the imperial past more specifically.  As time has passed since decolonization, 
empire has seemed to many increasingly insufficient either to explain the present or to 
imagine the future.  What, indeed, might the rehearsal of the cultural and social effects of 
colonialism mean for the task of building inclusive societies in new postcolonial orders, 
and what might we learn more generally about the need to rethink the politics of 
recognition, representation, and participation?  The question becomes more intractable 
precisely because there is no going back to a time before colonialism, when identities 
were less fixed, various forms of modernity less implicated in the violence of 
colonialism, and possibilities for cultural reinvention less mystified by the idea that 
political liberty and individual freedom only really mean the unrestricted movement of 
capital and labor in a global marketplace.  But it is precisely this historical background 
that must predicate any significant rethinking of how to respond to the claims of some 
cultural traditionalists that colonialism and Western power justify exceptionalist and 
fundamentalist reactions to the universal rhetoric of human rights, democracy, and 
individual freedom.  Indeed, it is my argument that only by directly engaging the 
distortions created by the imperial past can we confront the difficulties, but also the 
possibilities, for imagining new kinds of futures, and new kinds of justifications for 
universal values, standards, and institutions, both nationally and internationally.  
     
IX; Culture in the Postcolonial World:  Recognition, representation, participation, and 
transformation. 
 
Sadly, it is now clear that critiques of colonial history can be mobilized not just to 
argue against the powerful role of the West but ironically to reinstate reactionary 
responses to contemporary conditions that would be worse than returning us to some 
notional pre-colonial world, even if such a thing were thinkable.  It is therefore necessary 
to use the lessons of critical history not just to demonstrate the role of colonialism in 
irrevocably changing the character of the pre-colonial world but also to challenge the 
very colonialization of modernity by the West.  As we have just seen, uncritical versions 
of imperial history confer far too much credit onto a West that has justified itself – and its 
colonial ventures – precisely by claiming a monopoly on modernity, public virtue, 
secularism, tolerance, liberty, democracy, and so on.  Even as Britain, France, and other 
European powers sustained their colonial empires by declaring both their civilizational 
superiority and their commitment to improving the colonies (through education, social 
and moral reform, infrastructural investment, and political development), colonized 
peoples were able to use the contradictions of colonial rule to argue for self-rule.  As a 
consequence, it would be both wrong and misleading to infer from the above account that 
postcolonial cultures are either somehow irrevocably flawed or autonomous in significant   29
ways from the problematic histories and effects of cultural forms in the West itself.  
Additionally, we must remember that the colonized often adapted their own hybrid 
colonial institutions not just to force decolonization but to develop new forms of 
recognition, representation, and participation.   
One especially salutary example of this concerns the role of caste in political 
development in India.  Despite (and in part because of) the continuing horrors associated 
with caste privilege and oppression, caste has been used as a political vehicle for charting 
new ways of engaging Indian modernity, secularism, and democracy.
42  Caste has the 
dubious advantage of calling attention to largely hidden forms of social privilege, 
highlighting socio-historically determined modes of access to and exclusion from 
resources and opportunities, and marking the differentiated and particularistic forms of 
relationship to other social collectivities and religious beliefs and practices.  In many 
ways like the category of gender, caste both interrogates and acknowledges difference.  
Caste based discourses have insisted that cultural forms of exclusion and oppression can 
not be simply wished away, but instead need to be engaged directly through cultural (as 
well as social and economic) means.  Caste movements have sought representation 
through reservations and quotas, producing in their very opposition the recognition of the 
role of class in the organization of economic, political, and social power.
43  Caste 
movements have identified religious fundamentalism as the kind of political mystification 
used to obscure the significance of class and to mobilize compliant populist support for 
elite policies and programs.  Caste, in other words, has become the form of 
communitarian discourse and organization that has most effectively occupied the space of 
political society as recently proposed by Partha Chatterjee.
44  Caste, like other forms of 
tradition that have been irrevocably marked by their association with and use by colonial 
rule, can be seen as an example of the positive role culture can exert in the work that 
must be done to build the basis for genuinely inclusive postcolonial societies. 
  Given the recent wresting of control over caste discourses by “lower” caste 
political and social movements, including the extraordinary mobilizations by Dalit groups 
both in India and outside,
45 it may seem that caste is too easy an example of the need to 
take culture seriously – and as a potentially positive force – in the postcolonial world.  
What can we say about the ethnic and religious identities that occupy so problematic a 
role in many formerly colonized nations?  To begin with, we can point to the fact that 
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colonially “produced” identities often became the mobilizational force that led to 
decolonization and the successful delineation of postcolonial claims to sovereignty.  
Today, the universal rhetoric of national sovereignty that enables the constitutional 
charter of the United Nations constitutes one of the most powerful checks on the imperial 
ambitions of the United States.  If the universal rhetoric of human rights could be 
implemented more systematically and successfully in relation to the representative claims 
of the multiple nation states -- most of which are postcolonial states -- in the UN, it would 
be far more difficult to link the use of human rights discourses to the particularistic 
political purposes of the U.S. and other Western powers.  Indeed, the only way to counter 
the critical interrogation of the ways universal rights are proclaimed through international 
institutions is to build into the political process the essential role that must be played by 
nations and representative institutions that have experienced the coercive and distorting 
influences of colonial power.  The point here is not to forget too quickly either the 
accomplishments of postcolonial nations or the continuing challenges that past colonial 
rule still exerts on them.  Additionally, it must be said that histories of colonization vary 
enormously between the formerly colonizing and colonized worlds.
46 
  At the same time, the very power of postcolonial identities in their national 
contexts has invariably been linked to claims for greater recognition and access in respect 
to the rights of immigrant groups in former colonial nations.  Ethnic and religious 
community identities have been creatively used to expose some of the limits and 
contradictions of postcolonial rhetoric in nations such as Britain, France, and the 
Netherlands.  Calls for religious freedom, and the separation of church and state, have 
been significantly advanced by religious, ethnic, and national interests.  Even as, for 
example, the French antipathy to the practice of veiling has betrayed the ordinary 
prejudices of the postcolonial French state, the accusations of the British government 
about the lack of toleration within the Muslim community about, say, the Rushdie affair 
ironically made it possible for the representations of various “immigrant” communities 
about systematic discrimination and exclusion to be articulated more clearly.
47  
Immigration policies, as well as the general treatment of immigrant communities, have 
revealed the extent to which the universal norms of the West have been used to mask the 
fundamentally chauvinist and Christian parameters of national life in Europe and North 
America.
48  And yet, despite the continuation of many colonial policies through the 
contradictions inherent in immigration practices, there is little doubt that immigrant 
groups have exerted important, and occasionally productive, pressure on the insular and 
uncritical self-representations of Western neutrality and superiority. 
  As importantly, perhaps, the very rhetorics that proclaimed national self-
determination as the ultimate value driving anti-colonial movements have also made 
available both the best of universalizing languages (commitments to social and economic 
redistribution, the development of legal values and practices that would work against 
barriers of race, poverty, and illiteracy, and political collaboration with other postcolonial 
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nations through the Bandung conference and the emergence of the non-alignment 
movement during the cold war, as examples) and efforts to find new kinds of solutions to 
the intractable exclusions and contradictions of liberal political theory (as witnessed both 
in the early socialist commitments of many “third world” leaders as well as in the 
alternative visions of leaders such as Gandhi).
49  Despite the difficulties encountered by 
the postcolonial world, it is necessary not to lose sight of the enormous accomplishment 
not just of decolonization but of nation building during the second half of the twentieth 
century.  And it is important to keep in mind the ways in which postcolonial national 
politics have often successfully negotiated particularistic and exclusionary demands on 
behalf of dominating groups, communities, and interests, even as nations such as India 
have demonstrated the extraordinary hold democratic conventions and institutions have 
come to exert, as for example when they were so severely threatened under the 
emergency regime of Indira Gandhi.    
  Nevertheless, it is impossible to minimize the ways in which the divide and rule 
policies of European colonial powers have created religious and ethnic divisions that 
continue to inhere in the body politic of ex-colonies.  To appreciate the power of the 
colonial rule of difference it may be helpful to consider the contemporary position of 
“Islam” in the cultural politics of world struggle today.  Thirty years ago, the eminent 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz, who had studied Muslim societies in Indonesia and 
Morocco, noted that while all Muslims bowed towards the same place, they did so in 
opposite directions.
50  Indeed, the internal differences, disputes, and divisions within the 
so-called Islamic world have been as large as the successful mobilization of 
fundamentalist Islamist forces in places ranging from Pakistan and Afghanistan to 
Nigeria and Indonesia appeared unlikely.  And yet, under a barrage that has seen the 
further spread and entrenchment of American military and corporate interests across the 
Middle East, the identification of Islam by political leaders and public intellectuals such 
as Paul Wolfewitz, Donald Rumsfeld, Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington as the 
major civilizational threat for the West in the post-communist world, and the rise of new 
kinds of pressures in postcolonial states that have often experienced the worst of colonial 
rule, things have changed.  The cultural language of generalized disparagement has both 
served to distract from the geo-political issues at stake and to exacerbate the reality of 
cultural reaction and retreat.
51   
  Any serious effort to recommend national as well as international strategies for 
the building of more inclusive societies (and more generally, a more inclusive world) 
must therefore contend not just with the long history of western/colonial rule and its 
associated misperceptions and misrepresentations but also with the historical depth and 
force and its social and cultural effects.  The evident attractiveness of Islamist political 
and cultural movements must be evaluated in light of the reasons the West has generated 
such distrust and disregard as well as in terms that recognize the power of cultural and 
                                                           
49 See David A. Scott, Refashioning Futures: Criticism After Postcoloniality.  Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1999; also Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative 
Discourse. 
50 Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia.  Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1971. 
51 For two of many recent analyses that take up the geo-political issues at stake, see David Harvey, The 
New Imperialism.  New York: Oxford University Press, 2003; and David Hirst, The Gun and the Olive 
Branch; The Roots of Violence in the Middle East.  New York: Nation Books, 2003.   32
religious vocabularies to address centuries of abuse and oppression.
52  Cultural 
phenomena can not be evaluated in terms of the old (or even the new) civilizational 
hierarchies, even as these same forms must be recognized – and confronted – in order to 
allow them to play a significant role in the translation and transformation of universal 
values and claims.  Human rights, social justice, economic equality, individual freedom, 
political participation, and religious autonomy are, in my view, universal values.  But 
universal values only appear in historical forms and ways, and as such, my argument here 
is that we begin to advocate an historically conceived postcolonial approach to the 
articulation and advocacy of these values.  What exactly a postcolonial approach will 
come to advocate is beyond the scope of my present contribution to this report.  
However, that a postcolonial approach – replete with a robust understanding of the 
colonial historical conditions that have so influenced the contemporaneous present – must 
be seen as critical to the development of visions and strategies for building a better and 
more inclusive future seems beyond debate.  Or, rather, I argue here that any 
consideration of the task of thinking through the cultural conditions and social 
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